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This paper studies the evolution of interethnic attitudes, the integration or segregation dynamics of 
ethnic minorities and the conditions for the rising of ethnic-based social hierarchies. By means of a 
cultural evolution framework, a dynamics of interethnic attitudes is provided and conditions for 
their convergence derived. Steady states implying a constant role of racism and no role for racism 
are identified. Deriving sufficient conditions for convergence, we find that the way in which Oblique 
Socialization Schemes (the way children react to out-of-family stimuli when forming their cultural 
values) are defined and modelled becomes crucial for the structure of the derived long run 
equilibria. In particular, we find that Steady States implying an Ethnic-based social ranking or full 
integration of ethnicities may be reached depending on whether or not agents use Reciprocity 
and/or Ethnocentrism in their interethnic attitudes formation schemes. Allowing different groups 
for asymmetric use of reciprocity and Ethnocentrism, we explain why different ethnic minorities 
may show different integration patterns, and what are the different roles (Cultural bridge, cultural 
hub) an ethnic group may play in the integration process. Moreover, in this way, we explain why 
attitudes of some groups towards others converge to the same values, while other groups seems to 
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Interactions among dierent ethnicities in modern societies have always been a great con-
cern for many academics and politicians. The United States has been the rst country to
experience problems with interracial relationships, since the american society has always
been composed by people of dierent ethnicities. Now Europe is also starting to encounter
problems and opportunities deriving from a multicultural and multiethnic society. More-
over, given the actual rates of immigration, we can reasonably think that these issues will
become increasingly important for the Western societies.
Thus, this paper studies the evolution of interethnic attitudes, the integration or segrega-
tion dynamics of ethnic minorities and the conditions for the rising of ethnic-based social
hierarchies by means of a cultural evolution framework. Events as the banlieue riots in
Paris in 2005 or the more recent election of Barack Obama as president of the United
States, reopened a strong debte about integration of minorities: how much they get in-
tegrated in the society or how much they resist to integration in order to preserve their
identity. Moreover, anti-immigrant political parties in some European countries such as
Austria, the Netherlands or Italy rised the problem of native people worrying for their
weaker position in the society with respect to some decades ago. Other policy issues are
related with ethnic and racial discrimination: for example the debate about the Arma-
tive Actions that favours some minorities in the access to jobs and schools rises some legal
problems and debates among law scholars (for a review, Casadei and Re (2007)) with the
emergence of new directions in legal studies as with the Critical Race Theory (Thomas
and Zanetti (2005)), thus stressing the cultural origin of race and ethnic categorizations.
Again, security practices as the Racial Proling Techiques in order to discriminate poten-
tially dangerous agents, selecting people to be controlled on the basis of race, rises lots
of concernes, especially now that these techniques are used after the 9/11 (for a review,
Goldoni (2007)). Even before 9/11 this was a procedure used in some security controls:
for example black people complained that police agents stopped many black male drivers
without any evident justication but race, ironically saying that the police stopped the
person because he was `driving while black'. Consequently, as it is clear, understanding
better the mechanisms that govern these racial dynamics may thus be crucial in the pro-
motion of policies for integration.
Studies in sociology, anthropology and social psychology produced an incredible amount
of case studies trying to understand where and why integration or segregation phenomena
may happen, especially regarding school and marital situations. Lot of works regard the
Unites States because of availability of data and, especially, because the interethnicity of
the society is an historically rooted phenomenon. Many studies focus on blacks as McAdoo
(2006): it is one of the most interesting interdisciplinary works on this issue, since it brings
together the experience of people working on the eld as sociologists, pshycologists or even
therapists in order to study the integration/segregation forces in afro-american families.
Also Ogbu (1990) studied this problem focusing on how new generations are socialized
with respect to their socio-economical situation and the history of their own comunity,
thus providing useful insights on how socialization schemes work. This study also pro-
1I am really grateful to Alberto Bisin, Sergio Currarini, Piero Gottardi and Pier Luigi Sacco for their
comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
1vides an useful categorization of minorities regarding their history, and thus focusing on
the causal link between group history and the socialization mechanisms they adopt. Evi-
dence from other minorities such as Hispanics, Asians and Cubans (as in Masuoka (2006)
and Arias (2001)) or European immigrants communities (as, for the case of Italians, in
Form (2000)) has been deeply studied, particularly focusing on the fact that european
minorities usually experienced a faster integration that other non-european minorities as
Hispanics or Blacks.
More recently some sociological studies nd the existence of an ethnic hierarchy in the
society, meaning that the society converges to an agreement over attitutes towards the
ethnic groups. From an empirical point of view, this intergroup consensus over ethnic hi-
erarchies has been studied for US (Bobo and Zubrinsky (1996); Duckitt (1992)), Canada
(Berry and Kalin (1979, 1996)), Sweden (Snellman and Ekehammar (2005)), the Nether-
lands (Verkuyten and Kinket (2000)), as pointed out by Listhaug and Strabac (2008) that
provide the same evidence for Muslim minorities. From a theoretical point of view Ha-
gendoorn et al. (1995) explain why we observe ethnic hierarchies: this literature identies
the causes of this evolution of hierarchy in the process of prejudice formation, in a form of
cultural distance among groups and in the socio-economic status of the group. This kind
of studies try to understand why, in a society, a rank of the dierent ethnic groups could
be observed so that a sort of agreement on most preferrable ethncities arises. These works
rise important questions about the long run role of racism: is the ethnic social ranking
we observe stable enough for ethnicity to always play a role in people' choices? Or under
which conditions ethnic groups may agree on common attitudes towards anyother such
that an `end of racism' may be observed?
Even though some theoretical economic literature uses network theory in order to under-
stand segregation and its determinants (Jackson (2006) and Currarini et al. (2009)), here
we focus on a second line of research: cultural evolution. Cultural evolution theories have
their roots in the seminal work of Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1973, 1981) and Boyd and
Richerson (1985, 2005). These theories develop theoretical models trying to capture the
dynamics involved in the evolution of a given cultural trait. They are based on the inter-
generational transmission and modication of some characters having as peculiar element
the coevolution of biological and cultural traits. These models, originally developed by
anthropologists and genetists, had recently been applied by economists in order to explain
marriage choices in diverse societies. We use these theories since they provide instruments
to analyse how values are formed, and how they may spread in the society, taking care
of the interaction between this process and the environment in which the agents live: we
think that these are key elements in the study of a social phenomenon as the evolution
of interethnic attitudes. Moreover, given the fact that attitudes may be transmitted from
one person to the other through a kind of imitation, and, thus, they are susceptible of
modication, they can be considered as cultural traits without problems.
The rst works trying to introduce these concepts in the economic debate has been Bisin
and Verdier (2000, 2001) in which the transmission of a cultural trait is modelled, and
the dynamics of groups population is analyzed. In particular agents in these models are
allowed to socialize their children to their cultural trait. These works represents the start-
ing point to understand dierent phenomena about interethnic and religious intermarriage
using random search models. The most interesting contributions are Bisin et al. (2004,
22006) in which models for religious intermarriages in the US and interethnic preferences
in UK are set up. In particular, in Bisin et al. (2004) this model was used in order to
estimate the intensity of ethnic identities depending on the social context children are
rised.
In these last contributions, however, the cultural traits that are transmitted from one
generation to the other, are xed, so that only an analysis of the demographic trends
is possible. Brueckner and Smirnov (2007, 2008) and Pichler (2008) start to introduce
the possibility of a change in the intensity of the cultural traits. The rst contributions
provides some sucient conditions for convergence to a Melting Pot equilibrium, even
though it does not provide a theoretical model in which this cultural dynamcs happens;
the second one uses the Bisin-Verdier framework to introduce convergence to a melting
pot equilibrium. They dene a Melting Pot equilibrium a steady state in which all the
cultural traits converges to the same value.
This paper goes a little bit further in the analysis. We dene as `integration' the pro-
cess under which two ethnic groups share the same attitudes towards any ethnic group,
and 'segregation' when this does not happen, and dierences in attitudes are observed:
in our case integration does not mean that two groups have good attitude towards each
other, but just that their attitude vector is equal so that their cultural traits are identi-
cal. Moreover, we consider xed ethnicities, so that we are not interested in how and if
a melting pot society or mixed identities arise, but only under which conditions dierent
cultural groups converge in attitudes still remaining distingushed. We use, as starting
point, the Bisin-Verdier framework in which agents choose how much to socialize children.
However, dierently from these previous studies, we consider two cultural traits that are
contemporarily involved in the dynamics: `ethnicity' and `attitudes' towards other ethnic
groups. Since cultural evolution regards interaction between biological and cultural traits,
in our study ethnicity is biologically determined and thus xed but transmittable, while
attitudes are culturally derived and thus are transmitted and changed in the socialization
process, so that they are no more xed. Given this framewok we then consider what is
said by Boyd and Richerson (1985) in the rst pages of their rst contribution to cultural
evolution theories in which they argue that a theory for cultural evolution `should predict
the eect of dierent structures of cultural transmission on the evolutionary process'. In
particular, starting from dierent schemes of cultural transmission, we derive conditions
under which ethnic social rankings, as previously dened, arise in the long run, and when
attitudes converge to the same value, thus having a kind of `end of racism', providing
theoretical answers to these sociological questions, and also understanding when racism
may be endogenous in these cultural dynamics. Consequently, we explain ethnic social
hierarchies by using the rst factor Hagerdoorn et al. (1998) uses: prjudice formation.
In order to understand these dynamics, we study deeper a key element of cultural evo-
lution theories: the socialization mechanism. In particular, depending on how children
react to out of family stimuli (Oblique Socialization), the integration/segregation result
may change. Moreover we provide an analysis of what happens if groups dier in the
use of oblique socialization schemes and derive conditions over the interethnic relational
structures in order to get again ethnic hierarchies or a deeper integration. In all these
3cases, we underline the roles that a group may play in the intergroup relationships (cul-
tural bridges or cultural hub) and the role of particular socialization schemes (reciprocity
and ethnocentrism) understaning their impact on the long run outcome. We then use this
simplied framework in order to understand better what happened in the integration of
european and black miorities in the US. Using a minorities categorization provided by
Ogbu (1990), we try to give reason of the fact that europeans integrated almost perfectly
in the society and blacks experienced much more diculties. Again the key element for
this explanation is how Oblique Socialization aect the cultural transmission process. As
a last point, we provide a rst insight for time-dependent socialization schemes, focusing
on some conditions for convergence to long-run equilibria, thus opening a road towards
the endogeneization of socialization mechanisms.
The rest of the paper has the following structure: in section 2 we describe the model, in
section 3 we provide a general dynamics for cultural traits studying conditions for con-
vergence. Section 4 introduces the oblique socialization structures, while section 5 studies
what happens if dierent groups uses dierent socialization structures. Section 6 intro-
duces time-dependent oblique socialization structures. Section 7 ends the paper.
2 The Model
Consider a population composed of innitely many agents. Every agent is characterized by
the ethnicity, so that we can identify n ethnic subpopulations on the set V  fi;j;k;:::ng.
All the agents of a given ethnicity are supposed to be equal.
Agents of a given ethnicity i are also characterized by a vector V i
t 2 [0;1]n, that we call
`type', such that every entry is a coecient associated to an ethnic group. Below an ex-





















































All agents belonging to the same ethnic group have the same type. This vector is supposed
to be observable and common knowledge. The element on the jth position, for example
V
ij
t , represents the attitude i agents have towards j agents. This may be seen as an ob-
jective index that measures the prejudice or tolerance each ethnic group has towards any
other. Examples of this measures are the ones by Golebiowska (2007) in which measures
of reciprocal tolerance are derived by opinion surveys focusing on interpersonal trust and
other social indicators.
Other examples are derived by ethnic hierarchies studies in the social psychology eld, as
Hagendoorn et al.(1998), Listhaug and Strabac (2008), Berry (2006) and Schalksoekar et
al. (2004), in which indexes that indicate the attitudes among groups are estimated so that
an overview on how ethnic hierarchies may arise is given. This will be important in the
next sections since we will consider the insurgence of ethnic hierarchies as a possible long
4run equilibrium of the society. Such studies become now much more easier by means of
surveys as the World Value Survey or the International Study of Attitudes Towards Immi-
gration and Settlement (ISATIS), that make the objectivation of these measures possible.
A theoretical paper studying how these prejudices exist and are transmitted is given by
Bar-Tal (1997), in which the roles of context, socialization and individual variables are
examined.
Another set of studies that uses these indexes are derived from the Bogardus Social Dis-
tance Scale (Bogardus (1926, 1959)). These studies, mainly referred to social psychology
and psychometric techniques and developed in Hraba et al. (1999), Randall and Delbridge
(2005), Lee et al. (1996) and Parillo and Donoghue(2005), estimate, by means of scaling
systems, social dystance measures and indicators of how much groups reciprocally like.
In this way the measure of how much each group is tolerant towards any other, or has
prejudice towards the others, is rendered objective and can be thought as known by every
member that constantly lives in the society and interact daily with all the other members.
Thus this measure, since is derived from all the interactions that happen in the society, is
considered as common knowledge.
Given these priors, the structure of the model is the following: every agent, at time t,
reproduces asexually, so that a child is born from every agent. The child has the same
ethnicity of the parent, but has no `type' formed yet2. Thus, the parent produces a social-
ization eort i
t in order to in
uence the child type. In particular, the parents would like
to perfectly transmit their type to children, otherwise they experience a loss. However, so-
cialization is costly. The child type then is formed considering the eect of the parental (or
Vertical) socialization, and the societal (or Oblique) socialization. Oblique Socialization,
in particular, is how other adults with well formed types in
uence the children' socializa-
tion process. After this socialization process has taken place, children become adults with
dened types, can reproduce and start again the socialization of their children. Thus a
dynamics of cultural traits is endogenously derived.
Parents try to transmit to their children their own type by producing a socialization eort:
call i
t 2 [0;1] the eort parents i produce at time t in the Vertical Socialization. Children
type will thus be given by Vertical and Oblique Socialization forces following the standard






t + (1   i
t) V ij (1)
with  V ij 2 [0;1] being the eect of the Oblique Socialization process on the jth element of i
agents belonging to t+1 generation. We call this a Cavalli-Sforza Socialization Dynamics.
For the time being we do not characterize the Oblique Socialization.
Call Wi
t the utility agent i derives from having a child. Recalling that parents are happier
2Even though a pure genetic derivation of ethncity may be questionable, we use this simplicative
approach in order to observe what happens to groups that do not experince mixed identities. Moreover
an analysis of data as IPUMS (Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, for the US) show that this genetic
approximation follows the data: self-assessments of ethnicity generally follows the ethnicity belonging of
the parents.
5the more eectively they can trasmit their type to their children, we can thus have the
following:
Wi




t   V ik
t+1)2 (2)
It simply states that if the child has the same values in all the type vector entries as the
parent, then the parent has the highest possible utility from the child, V . Otherwise, he
additionally experiences a loss dependent on the dierence of the values. The parent also
experiences a cost c(i











t    V ik
t )2, thus representing the dierence between the eect of
oblique socialization over all type entries and parents type and being a general measure
of the parent's loss. Substitute the (1) into (2) and we get that the parent wants to
maximize




Thus the role of i
t is here more evident: the higher the eort, the lower the general loss of
the parent, but the higher the cost associated with this eort. Moreover, unless  V i
t = 0,
the marginal utility of i
t, which is equal to 2(1   i
t) V i
t , is positive and decreasing at a
constant rate and is zero at maximum socialization eort. Then,
Assumption 1: Assume that the socialization cost function has the following properties:
c() 2 C3, c0(i
t)ji
t=0 = 0 and c00(i
t) > 0
We can now state the following:
Proposition 1. If Assumption 1 holds, then i
t = Argmax[Wi
t;i( Vt;i
t;  pt)   c(i
t)] exists
and is unique 8t;i. Moreover if V
ij
t 6=  V ij for at least one j, then i
t 2 (0;1).
Proof. See Appendix C.
Assumption 1 states that costs should be 
at at zero socialization and have positive slope
elsewhere. This not very demanding assumption ensures the formation of an internal opti-
mal socialization eort. This result is supported from the evidence that both society and
parents actually enter in the children socialization process and in
uence his values. Only
if V
ij
t =  V
ij
t then the family and the society have the same eect on the children' type
so that, being the socialization costly, parents choose not to socialize children, since what
children can take from the society is the same they can transmit to the opring so that
no incentives for vertical socialization is present.
The society we describe here is very conservative in the sense that no agent has utility
derived from diversity, but everyone would like to have children with his own very same
6preferences. An usual explanation for this is that parents judge their opring by means
of their preferences so that they use what is called `imperfect empathy' (Bisin and Verdier
(2000)); we will maintain this behavioural assumption along all this work.
It has to be noted that these standard assumptions over socialization schemes imply that,
since parents know the exact outcome of Oblique Socialization, then they can fully de-
termine their children type and they are sure that their actions maximize their ex-ante
and ex-post utilities. Moreover, in this simplied framework, children have only a passive
role. Even though simplicative, for the time being we take these assumptions as true,
just recalling the limits of this view since, in reality, children actually play an active role
in their socialization process and there is also an element of uncertainty in oblique social-
ization that parents cannot control for, so that oblique socialization is subjected to a form
of ambiguity or, at least, of randomness.
3 Cultural Dynamics
We have seen in equation (1) that the dynamics of the cultural traits crucially depends on
how oblique socialization is dened since, depending on it, parents experiences dierent
losses and thus may choose dierent socialization eorts. In particular we referred with
 V ij to the generic oblique socialization eect on the element V
ij
t+1. We analyse here this
element.
The simplest way in order to intend oblique transmission of a cultural trait is taking the
social average for that trait. This imply that the child randomly meets agents belonging
to the parents' generation in the society and thus takes the average value from these en-















This can represent the most frictionless society we can imagine. For example the case in
which children live in a neighborhood with no biases in group shares, or attend schools
with professor of dierent ethnic groups in quota proportional to the population shares in
the overall society or ethnic messages are reported by media respecting the proportions of
ethnicities in the society. Moreover, unless i
t = 1, so that parents produce an enormous
socialization eort (but impossible under Assumption 1), it is impossible to have any V
ij
t
xed. This structure, then, restricts the possible in
uences of the Oblique Socialization
since it is not possible that in the V
ij
t+1 formulation process, i agents take care of the V kw
t
value, and it restricts the possible weights assigned to the dierent traits, xing them















t;ij is a parameter, that for the time being we consider exogenous, simply stating
if the agent consider the V kw
t in the V ij dynamic. This could be a measure of similarity
of situations, of trust or other factors that could also be proportional to the population
size of k: we generally call it `relevance parameter'. Given that these are weights, we have
0  wkw





The matrix of these parameters for each ethnic group gives a full characterization of the
oblique socialization technology at any time t.
In order to keep the model as simple as possible, for the time being we consider weights













We call this cultural dynamics a Generalized Cavalli-Sforza Socialization Dynamics. This
may be a rst approximation of reality if population shares do not change during time or
if the strucutre of the society (schools, neighborhoods, for example) are almost stable in
time.
In order to choose an optimal socialization eort, the parents should know the weights
vector their children are going to use in the oblique socialization eort and thus get a
precise computation of all the social in
uences they get.
Given this we can state the following:
Proposition 2. If Assumption 1 holds, then any Generalized Cavalli-Sforza Socialization
Dynamics converges to a steady state.
Proof. See Appendix C.
This proposition basically states that if socialization is such that parents always have
incentive to socialize their children at least a little bit, then convergence towards a steady
state happens. Thus, the role of vertical socialization is to ensure convergence since, if for
any reason  = 0 out of equilibrium, convergence may not happens and cycles may arise.
Proposition 2 does not say which kind of steady state is reached and thus leaves the door
open to dierent equilibria implying dierent levels of integration or segregation: this will
be the topic of the next sections.
From a technical point of view proposition 2 also generalizes the contributions of Brueckner
and Smirnov (2007, 2008) and Pichler (2008) since here we control for parents' socializing
role and for a wider range of possible interaction among ethnic groups, not restricting
to the cases in which the matrix of relevance parameters forms irreducible matrices or
block diagonal irreducible matrices, thus providing a more general sucient condition for
convergence. When, in section 6, we analyse time dependent weights, the generalization
of previous theorems is more complete.
At steady state it happens that i





so that parents and sons always have the same type. Consequently there is no incentive
to socialize children since the loss the parents experience is zero. This implies that, in the
8long run, parents would not have any role in the socialization: since they care only about
having children similar to them, once that this is an outcome of oblique socialization, they
do not care anymore about it.
Remark: In the proof of proposition 2 we also show that even for the case of suboptimal
socialization eorts, if i
t;8i is strictly positive, convergence happens, even though steady
state values may be dierent from the case in which the optimal i
t is chosen. Now, as
we have argued above, in order to choose an optimal socialization eort the parent should
know the whole matrix of all attitudes V , and the vector of weights  w his son is going
to use in the oblique socialization process. While the rst assumption may be reasonable
since the matrix of V is common knowledged, the second one may be questioned, since
oblique socialization in
uences may not be perfectly predicted by parents. Still, even if
the parent has a wrong guess of the relevance parameters, and thus choose an ex-post
suboptimal socialization eort, if the chosen  2 (0;1], then convergence happens. From
a mathematical point of view, i
t > 0;8i make the diagonal entries of the transmission
matrix A strictly positive. Thus, the matrix A, or its diagonal blocks, if irreducible, are also
acyclic. However, it is not necessary to have i
t > 0 in order to have acyclic matrix, since
an acyclic matrix may also derive from some particular structures of oblique socialization.
However, since we have not put constraints on the oblique socialization scheme, i
t > 0
ensures acyclic matrix. This will become clear with the next sections. Then, far from being
useless, dierent level of vertical socialization have eect on the levels of the steady state.
Morevoer, the introduction of the optimal socialization eort makes the model richer, such
that it will be useful in policy and welfare analysis. Ongoing research is actually focused
on these last issues.
4 Oblique Socialization Schemes and Evolution
4.1 Socialization Schemes
In the last section we proved that convergence to a steady state happens under some
weak conditions. However, a crucial element of cultural dynamics is how children are
in
uenced during their Oblique Socialization. As Boyd and Richerson (1985) explain in
the rst pages of their contribution to cultural evolution studies, `the theory should pre-
dict the eect of dierent structures of cultural transmission on the evolutionary process'.
In our case a structure of cultural transmission in characterized by the structure of the
relevance parameters matrix. Any vector of these parameters identies an Oblique So-
cialization Scheme. In order to follow the Boyd-Richerson approach, starting from simple
socialization schemes we now derive long run equilibria that can be considered sensitive
in the study of integration and segregation of groups, so that an analysis of how dierent
socialization structures in
uence the process is the key element of the rest of the paper.
We nd reasonable that, while forming their attitudes towards other groups, agents may
use two basic schemes: Reciprocity and Ethnocentrism. With the rst one we mean that
people tend to form bad (good) attitudes towards people that have a bad (good) atti-
tude towards them. With the second one we mean the possibility that a group have a
good attitude towards people of the same ethnic group and never question this attitude.
9Looking at studies in sociology and social psychology it can also be found (Berry (2006)
and Berry and Kalin (1979, 1996), for example) that agents actually use Reciprocity and
Ethnocentrism in their attitude formation schemes. In particular, the correlation between
inter-group attitudes has been computed and has been found positive so that Reciprocity
seems to be an actual way of attitude formation; on the other side ethnocentrism has been
proved to exists in all cases even though with dierent intensities depending on the ethnic
group.
In terms of our model, Reciprocity means that w
ji
ij > 0, so that V
ji
t enters in the forma-
tion of V
ij
t+1, and if j has a bad (or good) attitude towards i, then i children take this into
account while forming their attitudes. With Ethnocentrism we mean that agents do not
question the re
exive attitudes, so that wii
ii = 1 ) V ii
t = V ii
t+1.
We thus build 4 general socialization schemes in which there can be no reciprocity and no
ethnocentrism, or one of the two or both. With respect to the equation (5) the following
schemes are restrictions of the most general case since we impose particular structures on
the relevance parameters matrix. Thus:
Denition 2: Call
 Emulation Rule an oblique socialization rule in which
(wkw





















 Ethnocentrism Rule an oblique socialization rule in which
(wkw


















































t )8j 6= i;8t;





























t )8j 6= i;8t.
The rst scheme has neither Reciprocity nor Ethnocentrism so that the attitude V
ij
t+1
depend on all the attitudes of everyone towards j. In this case, even though the weights
may represents frictions in the ethnic relations, no intergroup relation or cross in
uence is
inhibited. In the second case we introduce ethnocentrism so that V ii
t = V ii
t+1. Since i
t 2
(0;1) under Assumption 1, in order to have this we impose that wii
ii = 1;8i. In this case all
the other V
ij
t ;8i 6= j follow the previous rule. In the third case the reciprocity introduce
10the possibility of having w
ji
ij > 0 so that V
ij
t+1 depends on the attitudes towards j plus the
attitude of j towards i. The fourth case just combines the previous two situations.
4.2 Steady State Characterization
In this subsection we focus on steady states, identifying 4 classes of them that may be
considered benchmark outcomes of cultural dynamics: we consider them in relation to
their integration or segregation properties.
As previously argued, in some literature there has been found evidence of social hierarchies
based on ethnicity: in particular agents seem to agree on a ranking of dierent ethnicities,
so that common prejudices arise. In terms of our model, if a common hierarchy is shown,








t 8i;k. We call these kind of steady states Hierarchy Equi-
libria (HE). This situation may be represented by the following matrix in which every row
is a type vector so that the ij entry is the V
ij
t .
HE i j ::: k
i a b c d
j a b c d
::: a b c d
k a b c d
Suppose for example that a > b > c > d then there is an intergroup consensus on the
fact that i ethnic groups is the best ethnic groups since everyone has the best attitude
towards it. On the reverse k agents has a bad attitude towards themselves too, and are
also considered the worst group among all.








t 8i;j;k;w. If a steady state like this is reached, then a process by which all agents
will end up with the same atitude towards every ethnic group has taken place. We call
these outcomes Integration Equilibria (IE). This equilibrium can be seen as the objective
of integrationist policies. In this case, however, it does not happen that all groups merge
in one single culture, but only that they do not discriminate among any culture. Every
group, in fact, can continue to have its own cultural norms, and the society may continue
to be formed by dierent cultural ways of life (since these cultural traits are not involved
in this process), what converges here is just the attitutes groups reciprocally have. Thus,
given our framework, this cannot be dened as a Melting Pot equilibirum. The second
matrix represents this case.
IE i j ::: k
i a a a a
j a a a a
::: a a a a
k a a a a
11We should underline that Hierarchy and Integration Equilibria are not good or bad states
a-priori. With integration, in fact, we simply mean that all attitudes converge to the same
value, so that it does not mean that these attitude should be good. It may happen that an
IE is reached with very low nal values, meaning that everyone has a bad attitude towards
anyother, so that a very bad society is shown. On the reverse it can be that, in the rst
case, a ranking s shown but all the values are high, and thus represent very good attitudes.
Thus, by the terms `hierarchy' and `integration', it is not meant any phenomenon with a
specic positive or negative moral signicance
In some situations it may not be the case that the groups which is considered as the worst
one, is also self-considered bad. In order to control for this problem we add two more
cases to the matrices above, implying that a sort of ethnocentric scheme, as for example
found in Berry (2006) and Berry and Kalin (1979, 1996), may be considered. We can thus
dene Hierarchy Equilibria with Ethnocentrism (HEE) and Integration Equilibria with
Ethnocentrism (IEE)(Suppose V ii
t = E 8t;i):
HEE i j ::: k
i E b c d
j a E c d
::: a b E d
k a b c E
IEE i j ::: k
i E a a a
j a E a a
::: a a E a
k a a a E
If we suppose that E = 1, then the attitude every ethnic group member has towards own
ethnic group members is maximum. In this case an agreement on the attitude values
holds, but everyone considers himself at the top of the ranking. The same may happen in
the second case in which convergence of all attitudes towards the same value may happen,
but still a form of ethnocentrism holds. In this last case, represented by the last matrix,
every agent can only discriminate with his attitudes between members of his own groups
and others out of the group.
4.3 Eect of Oblique Socialization Schemes
Given the previous denition of particular socialization schemes and steady states, we can
now state the following:
Proposition 3. A sucient condition in order to get:
 HE is that Emulation Rule holds;
 IE is that Reciprocity Rule holds;
 HEE is that Ethnocentrism Rule holds;
 IEE is that Reciprocity and Ethnocentrism Rule holds;
Proof. See Appendix C.
12With the last proposition we obtain an interesting result since, starting from two rules
(Reciprocity and Ethnocentrism) important in the attitude formation schemes and derived
from social psychology literature, we are able to prove convergence to four categories of
steady states signicant for their social properties. In particular we obtain that both
racism-free and non racism-free steady states may be obtained given some condition over
the oblique socialization schemes so that we can also state that racism may be a result
of factors internal in the children socialization process, indirectly implying that policies
that modify these schemes may have important results in term of racism outcomes. In
particular a change in socialization structures such as reciprocity, widely changes the nal
outcome dramatically. We thus give reason of the intuition of Boyd-Richerson about the
importance of the analysis of the cultural transmission schemes for the analysis of the long
run equilibrium of the society.
Additionally, proposition 3 makes clear that, is oblique socialization rules are such that
w
ij
ij > 0;8i;j parents do not play any role in the determination of the class of the long run
equilibrium and convergence may happen without their contribution. However dierent
socialization eorts will have an in
uence on the nal levels. We will see, in the next
section, that their presence may become important if a more general set of socialization
rules is considered.
























































































































Figure 1: Simulations with xed weights
Figure 1 provides examples for the dynamics for the case of 3 ethnic groups in order to
13better understand what goes on. We consider here 3 ethnic groups and c(i
t) = i2
t as a
simplest cost function satisfying the requirements of assumption 1. We then set up weights
proportional to the population shares but since population shares do not change, this is
just a way to give a rule for the socialization weights. Thus a socialization dynamics as
in equation (4) holds. We consider an equal population distribution among ethnic groups.
Weight matrices are reported in Appendix A for all the four cases. Moreover we set up
E = 1 in order to get the idea that groups may consider themselves as the best ones in
the case in which ethnocentrism holds. However since E refers to type entries that do not
experience any dynamics, this value can be change accordingly to cases.
The top-left simulation regards a HEE equilibrium: after a very short adjustment we have
at the top all the V ii
t ;8i, while each horizontal line then represents the attitude towards a
specic ethnic groups, so that an ethnic hierarchy rises. The graph below shows the same
socialization rule, but without ethnocentrism, so that also re
exive attitudes converge to
the common ranking values. The graphs on the right represent, on the top a IEE and
on the bottom a simple IE. In the rst one we see that all attitudes, but re
exive ones,
converge to the same value, while in the second one re
exive attitudes too converge to the
common value.
It is interesting now to study if steady states classes are invariant under changes in the
socialization schemes. In particular, assume that the steady state has been reached using
the proper socialization scheme and that only the 4 socialization schemes previously de-
ned may be used by agents.
Denition: We say that an IE (resp. IEE, HE, HEE) is invariant under a change in the
socialization scheme if the new equilibrium under the new scheme is an IE (resp. IEE,
HE, HEE).
We can thus state the following:
Corollary 1: An IE is invariant under any change of socialization scheme, while a HEE
is not invariant under any change of socialization scheme. An HE is invariant if ethno-
centrism is added, while is not invariant if reciprocity is added. An IEE is invariant if
reciprocity is removed and not invariant if ethnocentrism is removed.
Corollary 1 states that in this framework, once that an IE happened, no changes in the so-
cialization process may alter the equilibrium class. On the contrary, if integration has not
happened, then there is room for it to be reached if socialization schemes change appropri-
ately. In particular, starting from a HEE, then any of HE, IEE, IE may be reached adding
respectively reciprocity, removing ethnocentrism or doing both actions. If the starting
situation is an HE, then by adding reciprocity an IE may be reached, while from IEE, by
removing ethnocentrism an IE may be obtained. The reverse processes may not be done
so that, once that integration is obtained, it is impossible to create segregation from it
only by changing the model parametrization.
14Until now we have shown sucient conditions for convergence. With the next corollary we
provide necessary conditions for convergence to the HE-HEE class of equilibria, if every
agent of every ethnic group uses the same socialization scheme, that we call `symmetric
socialization scheme':
Corollary 2: A Necessary condition for convergence to a HEE or HE with symmetric
socialization schemes is that reciprocity does not enter in the socialization schemes.
Corollary 2 states that an ethnic hierarchy may be substained in the long run only if
no reciprocity holds. This necessary condition may be of some relavance since, in some
political talkings on immigration, reciprocity is viewed as a way to introduce incentive
for the building of a good attitude world. Sometimes, the subtle justication for these
action calls lie in the willingness of maintaining the present ethnic social ranking. With
this framework we show that both these reasonings may be wrong since reciprocity is the
principal scheme for allowing cross-dependence of cultural values and thus for integration,
as dened here, does not imply a good-attitude world. On the other side reciprocity, if
applied in this symmetric socialization scheme, is incompatible with the preservance of an
ethnic social hierarchy.
5 Asymmetric Socialization Rules
In the previous propositions and corollaries we have analysed the cases in which every
agent of every ethnic group follows the same socialization scheme, so that symmetric so-
cialization rules are implied. In particular every ethnic group applies a reciprocity schemes
towards any other groups, or no one does towards anyother. Moreover everyone is eth-
nocentric or no one is ethnocentric. Emulation Rule imposes that w
kj
ij > 0;8i;j;k;t so
that all ethnic groups are considered in the process and every ethnic groups considers all
the other groups in the socialization scheme. These cases, however, can limit the analysis
since dierent ethnic groups may show dierent socialization schemes depending on vari-
ous social situations, or simply for any reason that we can think causes heterogeneity in
socialization schemes: in particular it can be that a given group i can consider j's cultural
traits as relevant while k's traits as irrelevant and thus using an appropriate socialization
scheme. We will now take into account this possible heterogeneity. However we continue
to suppose that within each ethnic group, all the agents use the same socialization scheme.




t is a node, and call U the set of all the nodes.
Then, the directional link V
ij
t ! V kw
t is built if and only if wkw
ij > 0.
Call Pkw
ij the set of the possible paths, both direct or non-direct, from V
ij
t to V kw
t
Dene now a sink the set






t 2 S;8V nx
t 2 S;8V kw
t = 2 Sg.
Thus a sink is a set of nodes such that there is no path from any of them to any node
outside the sink. The sink may be composed either of only one node or of more than one
15node. In the rst case a node V
ij
t is a sink if and only if w
ij
ij = 1 since in this case any
other wkw
ij = 0 and thus no links are formed towards outside. In terms of our model this
means that the attitude is not questioned, and thus no dynamics will be shouwn for this
trait. As a consequence, if ethnocentrism applies then V ii
t is a sink. In the case in which
the sink is composed of multiple nodes, then they are strongly connected, meaning that if
V
ij
t 2 S;V nx
t 2 S ) Pnx
ij 6= ;. Moreover, taken any node not belonging to any sink, there
should exist a path that connect it to a sink, otherwise it would belong to a sink itself.
This means that if there is only one sink then there should exist a path from any element
out of the sink to an element of the sink.
With this framework we have that, depending on the relevance parameters, the structure
of the network may dier but, given that they are time independent, the structure of the
network does not change with time.
We use this kind of setup since, on one side, there is a strong link between the network
structure and the transition matrices we use for proving convergence sicne a matrix is
irreducible if and only if the associated directed graph is strongly connected; on the other
side networks may give a more intuitive view of the relationships between ethnic groups
in attitudes formation schemes, and thus it will be easier to identify relationships among
ethnic groups and oblique socialization structures. Moreover, in order to study steady
state classes, there is no need to know the weights intensity, but just if they exists or
not. In fact, proposition 3 states that if a given oblique socialization structure exists, then
convergence to a particular steady state happens without regards to the the intensity of
the single in
uences. Thus, we are interested in wether the links exist or not, rather than
their intensities.
In order to control for asymmetric socialization rules, we start relaxing a little bit the Em-
ulation Rule as previously dened. In that case w
kj
ij > 08i;j;k, meaning that all agents
consider as relevant all the other ethnicities in the society in their socialization scheme. A
more complex relational structures with some w
kj
ij = 0 may be considered. Thus:
Assumption 2: Consider a Socialization rule such that wkw
ij = 0;8w 6= j, and w
kj
ij  0;8k.
Note that this is compatible with w
ij
ij = 0, for some i;j, so that the diagonal entries of the
transmission matrix may be null. Then the following proposition holds:
Proposition 4. A sucient condition in order to have an HE is that
 Assumptions 1 and 2 hold
 The nodes V
ij
t form a single component 8i;t
 each component is strongly connected or has only one sink
Proof. See Appendix C.
Proposition 4 states that HE may be reached under a big variety of socialization struc-
tures as far as all the V
ij
t ;8i, depend directly or indirectly from each others (this is the
case in which the component is strongly connected) or there is one sink, so that every
16other depends on it. Moreover, since now oblique socialization rules do not ensure aciclyc
matrix anymore, positive vertical socialization enters as a sucient condition for conver-
gence. Figure 2 gives some examples of these cases and in particular of strongly connected
networks.
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Figure 2: Strongly Connected Network
What does this mean in terms of relationships among groups? The rst implication is
that is it not needed that every group has contacts with all the other groups or consider
them reliable during the socialization process in order to have a hierarchy of attitudes.
Consequently we can have convergence to a HE even if there are strong frictions in the
contacts among groups. The idea is that it is not necessary to be in touch with group k in
order to know and maybe take its values as ours. It could be enough to be in touch with
group j that is in touch with group k so that, by means of j we can consider k values in
our socialization process. Consider, for example, the rst graph of gure 2. In this case
i and k reciprocally get in
uenced and j and w do the same. However k and j are also
reciprocally linked. These two ethncities thus can be considered as cultural bridges for
ethnic groups that do not have contacts. Suppose for example that i and j are ethnicities
that refuse to get in
uenced each other, while both of them have contacts with k. This
may be the case for two con
ictual ethnic minorities (i and j) and a majority (k). The role
of the majority in this case is not to simply report to i the j's values and viceversa, but to
incorporate these values in its values and, by this process, making them acceptable by the
third ethnicity. i does not trust j, but trusts k so that j's values may become acceptable
if proposed by k, after having internalized them through its socialization process.
However, the case for these cultural bridges may only be one case.
The second case reported by the graph is the one in which one ethnicity is considered as
a cultural hub. Suppose that an ethnic group k, for its role in the society, is the most
open ethnic group such that k children have contacts with all the other groups and gets
17in
uenced by them and, also, all other groups' children get in
uenced by it. In this case
the `hub' k is a collector of all others' cultural values, it produces a synthesis and in
uences
the others . In this way everyone gets everyothers' values by means of the cultural hub,
so that the weight vector that k uses become crucial for the determination of the steady
states values.
The last case represented in gure 2 happens if there are `cultural circles'. In this case
no groups has a predominant role but it just processes a little part of the overall cultural
values and it passes to other groups in a circle. This last cases also makes clear the role
of vertical socialization in ensuring convergence. Suppose that a scheme as the one with
a cultural circle holds. Suppone then that parents do not socialize at all their children
so that i
t = 0;8i;t, so that assumption 1 does not hold. Then in this case convergence
does not happen since there are cyclic matrices and thus a 
uctuation of cultural traits is
shown, unless all the values happen to coincide at time 0.
Until now we have analysed cases in which the network is strongly connected. Proposition
4, however, provides a wider range of possibilities, an particularly the case in which there
is a sink. Figure 3 provides graphical examples for these cases.
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Figure 3: Not Strongly Connected Network
The top-left and the bottom cases represent two dierent ways of intending a sinks: the
former one in which the sink is a single value, and the latter in which the sink is a set
of values. The last case may happen if a new group (x in the graph) enters the society.
Still, the society has a structure of interethnic relationships, and this structure may be
independent from the newcomers, and may also remain unaected by the come of x. Thus
the old society structure forms a sink, and the new comers may somehow depend on it
with links to some of the existing groups.
On the other side, the rst case may happen when there is one cultural model that is rec-
ognized by everyone. The model does not change in time and everyone depends directly,
or by means of cultural bridges, on it.
18Since cultural models are represented as sinks it is important to consider the following
corollary directly derived from the proof of proposition 3:
Corollary 3: If there is one sink, then the cultural values converge to the convergence
point of the sink. If there are multiple sinks then an HE may not be reached.
This corollary states that cultural models determine the long run path of the society. This
same fact, however, may also describe what happens if multiple cultural models are in the
society, as in the top-right example in gure 3. Since thare are two con
icting cultural
models which do not cross in
uence, then HE may not be reached unless the cultural
models have, by chance, the same value. So, if there exist more than one cultural model
an HE may not be reached, since every group may consider each model with dierent
intensities, and these weights determine the long run equilibrium of the cultural values.
This means that if, for every ethnic attitude, more than one group does not question its
values, then an HE may not be reached.
Until now we have analysed the case in which a HE may be reached. We can similarly
consider the conditions for reaching a IE.
Proposition 5. A sucient condition in order to have an IE is that
 Assumptions 1-2 and Oblique Socialization Stability holds
 The nodes V
ij
t form a single component 8i;j;t
 the component is strongly connected or has only one sink
Proof. See Appendix C.
This proposition is very similar to the one for HE with the dierence that now all cultural
values may be somehow linked each other. Until now, the instrument that makes this
possible is Reciprocity. However, it is not needed that everyone uses reciprocty towards
anyother in order to obtain an IE. Suppose, in fact, that every ethnic group uses a Em-
ulation Rule (resp. Ethnocentrism Rule) so that a HE (resp. HEE) is reached. Suppose
now that one group starts to use reciprocity towards any other group. Figure 4 provides
a graphical example for this case.
In this case group k uses reciprocity towards anyother. As a result, the long run equilib-
rium will be an IE in which the nal attitude of everyone towards anyother is given by
the attitude that everyone had towards k at the beginning, since the set S = fV
ij
t ;8i;tg
is a sink. In this way, the role of reciprocity is much more clear: if reciprocity is used
by an ethnicity everyone think is bad, then a bad attitude of everyone towards anyother
may be a result. If, on the reverse, it is used by a well reputed ethnicity, then a long
run equilibrium in which everyone have good attitudes towards other may be likely to be
observed.
19V
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Figure 4: Reciprocity
Another interesting case happens when reciprocity chains are observed, meaning that each
ethnic group uses reciprocity towards another one and a chain or a circle is observed, so
that again an IE is reached.
In the case for IE, as in the HE cases, the roles for cultural bridges and cultural hubs may
be equally reproduced. Moreover, proposition 5 opens the rowad to dierent schemes of
oblique socialization others that reciprocity such that, linking all nodes together, may be
responsible for convergence to an IE.
Until now we provided sucient condition for convergence to the dierent classes of equi-
libria given asymmetric socialization rules. We study now the existence of some necessary
conditions under this asymmetric socialization schemes framework. A condition for both
hierarchy and integration classes of equilibria is the following:
Corollary 4: A Necessary condition for convergence to a HE and HEE is that all the
sinks belonging to a given component converge to the same value.
A Necessary condition for convergence to an IE and IEE, is that all the sinks converge to
the same value.
This corollary states that if there are more cultural models in
uencing the same cultural
traits, then an equilibrium belonging to one of the previous described classes may not
been shown. In fact, every trait may be dierently in
uenced by the multiple models
and thus every trait converges to a dierent value. Now, if a multiplicity of dierent
cultural models may be compatible with a convergence to a HE, since every component
may have one dierent sink, on the contrary in order to have an IE it is necessary that
all the cultural models of the society converge to the same value. Thus a multiplicity and
diversity of cultural models may preclude long run integration equilibria. If, for example,
20an ethnicity does not question two or more of its cultural values, that IE cannot be reached
5.1 The case for dierent integration paths: an example
We try now to apply this framework to a situation often studied in literature: why euro-
pean minorities integrated faster in the US society while blacks did not? What follows is
just a very simplied scheme of what happened and why, so that we only want to capture
the main forces implied by the analysis of socialization schemes that operated in this pro-
cess. In this sense it is useful to take what Ogbu (1990) found in his work. Ogbu studied
long this problem and is considered one of the most important contributors to the theory of
minorities. We take here his classication of minorities into voluntarily and involuntarily
minorities. The rst ones are minorities that arrive in a country as immigrants that want
to gain a better life style, so that they are a-priori more prone towards the majority values.
The second ones are groups forced to go in the US, conquered or enslaved. In terms of US
history we may think at Blacks and, for dierent reasons, Natives and part of Hispanics.
Consequently a group is considered as voluntary or not depending on its history. Ogbu
then studied the dierent approaches of these groups to education and assimilation to the
main culture. For sure we cannot make group history endogenous in this model, but we
can analyse what is its eect on the long run, supposing that it only have eect on the
Socialization schemes the agents would use. Thus, since the only factor history may have
eect on in this model is oblique socialization structure, we try to capture this eect using
the rules of Ethnocentrism and Reciprocity previously analysed.
In order to make our model operative in this framework we consider the following social-
ization schemes belonging to the two minorities classes idented by Ogbu (1990), and the
majority:
 Voluntary minority: Agents do not use reciprocity towards anyone and are only
in
uenced by the majority values: if the majority consider the ethncity k a bad
ethnicity, they tend to do so and to conform to majority attitudes. These people
want to be more part of the values of the majority because, being immigrants, they
think the society could give them a higher role. They thus think that discrimination
is a temporary phenomenon, so that they are more prone to forgive it. Moreover
they use ethnocentrism. We represent them here with the letter E, as European.
 Involutary minority: Agents just use reciprocity towards everyone: these people
do not think that the majority has values compatible with theirs and, given their
history of segregation, they tend to be suspiscious and to punish every discrimination
they face. Since they feel unconfortable in the society they build bad attitudes
towards people having bad attitudes towards them, and good attitude towards whom
has good attitude towards them. Moreover they use ethnocentrism. We represent
them here with the letter B, as Blacks.
 Majority: Agents act with reciprocity towards everyone: these people, being the
historical majority of the country, think that their values are the best ones and are
21not prone to change them. They also sanction anyone has a bad attitude towards
them and give a prize the good attitudes. Moreover they use ethnocentrism. We
represent them here with the letter A, as Americans.
Note that the Involuntary Minority and the Majority basically apply the same rule, but
for dierent reasons: the majority does not want to loose its primacy in values, and thus
with reciprocity apply a penalty towards anyone that does not respect this primacy; on the
contrary, by means of reciprocity, they rewards anyone who share their values contributing
to maintain their primacy. Involuntary minorities, on the reverse, given that they face an
adverse environment, they tend to be nice towards anyone who is nice to them, and mean
towards who is mean as if it continues to perpetrate their inferior role in the society.
Figure 5 represents these socialization rules in the network structure.
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Figure 5: Minorities - Majority Socialization Scheme
The solid lines represent the weight structure as described above. Given this structure we
have that, in the long run V AA = V AE = V AE. This means that, as we almost observed,
European has been going to be considered very good by americans, due to the fact that
they kept the values of americans and, for doing so, they had beed rewarded with better
attitude, so that an almost full integration between these groups may be observed. Now,
even european groups as italians, at rst considered dierent from all the other northern
european groups, are almost as integrated as other americas are.
On the other side we have that V BA = V AB = V EB = V BE. What drives this dynamic is
the reciprocity rule that both Blacks and American apply each other. In term of network,
these two values (V BA and V AB) represent a sink. This means that, having begun with
low attitudes each others, given the history of enslavery and discrimination, the long run
equilibirum is a reciprocal bad attitude: in a very dichotomic and simplied way, blacks
treat whites bad because has been treatad bad while whites treat them bad because they
are treated bad, thus building a chain with no end.
Then Europeans, in their integration willingness, took the american attitude in their
formation scheme so that V EB ! V AB. Morever, since blacks use reciprocity we also have
22that V BE = V EB. At the end blacks end up with the same attitude towards europeans and
americans (so that europeans and american do not only consider themselves as integated
each other, but are also perceived as integrated by blacks), so that they have bad attitude
towards everyone and everyone have bad attitude towards them. Moreover, no one needed
to change the re
exive attitude.
Had the situation could have evolved dierently? Or, may the situation be changed in
order to achieve an integration for blacks too? The dashed lines represent some alternatives
in socialization schemes in order to reach a dierent steady state. The rst theoretical
possibility we consider is that V AB is in
uenced by V BB. In this way V BB represents
a sink and thus there would be convergence towards a good attitude towars blacks: this
socialization rule seems however unreasonable.
What if E consider B in their formation? Suppose to have immigrants, but not totally
prone towards A: suppose then that the link V EA ! V BA is built. In this case V EA
would end up in a linear combination of V AA and V BA so that europeans would end up
in between the two extremes. This, however, would not delete the bad attitude from and
towards B. In the same time Europeans would consider Americans worst that before, and
thus do americans with europeans.
Suppose now the possibility that E work as cultural bridges so that B trusts them, even
if very little: in this case the only sink would be V AA and a good attitude of everyone
towards anyother would arise. This underlines the strong importance of these cultural
bridges in prejudice formation. These would happen independently from the streght of
the links, so that, for the long run outcome, it is more important the role of cultural bridge
that the intensity of this role.
All this analysis, however, is based on static weights exogenously given by some induction
over the groups history, so that there could be space for deeper study of socialization rules
with time dependent and endogenous weights.
6 Time-Dependent Oblique Socialization
Starting from equation (6) we have constrained the oblique socialization rule to be xed
along time. However, this may not be the case, since the society composition may change,
and thus weights may change as well along time following dierent possible rules. We thus
now study what happens if a more general specication of the cultural dynamics is taken













so that oblique socialization weights may change with time. It is not in the purposes of
this paper to produce specic dynamics for these weights: consequently, we analyse suf-
cient conditions in order to get convergence with time-dependent weights, and sucient
condition for convergence to particular classes of steady states, independently from the
specic weights dynamics we consider.




t;kw 6= 0;8i;j;k;w;8t > 0.
This assumption is satised if, at least after some point in time, if a cultural trait A
directly in
uences cultural trait B, then the trait B in
uence also the trait A. Speaking
with network language this means that all the links that exist in a network, after a period
of time T have to be bidirectional. To notice that a direct consequence of this assumption
is that every component of the derived directed graph is strongly connected.
Assumption 4: (Temporal Stability) There is a temporal stable oblique socialziation rule
if 9T : wkw
T+t;ij 6= 0 , wkw
T+t+1;ij 6= 0 or wkw
T+t;ij = 0 , wkw
T+t+1;ij = 0;
8i;j;k;w;8t > 0.
Thus Oblique Socialization Stability is a property of weights such that, after some pe-
riods of time, the way in which ethnicities are in
ueced each others is stable. Namely,
if i agents do not consider j agents, they continue with this scheme forever and if they
consider them they continue in this way forever. As a direct consequence of this property
wkw
T+t;ij = 1 , wkw
T+t+1;ij = 1 and wkw
T+t;ij 2 (0;1) , wkw
T+t+1;ij 2 (0;1). Moreover, if
assumption 4 holds, then after time T the network structure is xed.
Thus, given these assumptions,t we can state the following:
Proposition 6. If Assumptions 1-3-4 hold, then any generalized Cavalli-Sforza socializa-
tion dynamics converges to a steady state. If Assumptions 1-4 hold and, at time T there
exists only one sink for each component, then convergence happens.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Last proposition states that if we set up any weights dynamics such that symmetry is
satised and after a time T it is also stable, then convergence happens. An example for















so that the socialization weights are represented by the population weights. As previously
argued, this represents the most frictionless society we can imagine. Suppose then that
the population dynamics is such that no group ever gets extinguished. Then we can state
the following:
Corollary 5: If cultural dynamics is represented by equation (4) and no population ever
get extinguished, then convergence to an IE occurs.
24Last corollary put into this context what Brueckner and Smirnov (2007, 2008) and Pichler
(2008) found in their works, and shows how this is only one specic case that can be
represented in this cultural evolution context.
From a technical point of view, the second part of proposition 6 also extends the results
of Brueckner and Smirnov (2007, 2008), since we add sucient conditions for convergence
if the transition matrix cannot be rewritte as a block diagonal matrix with irreducible
diagonal blocks, as shown in the proof of proposition 6.
Then, we can also state the following more general sucient condition for convergence to
a HE:
Corollary 6: If assumptions 1-2-3-4 hold, then, if at time T the network derived from
the socialization weights has only one sink per component, then an HE occurs.
Last corollary states that, apart from the sucient conditions for convergence, since as-
sumption 4 implies time stability of network structure, the structure of the network at
time T can indicate the class of steady state it will be reached.
7 Conclusion
Existing economic cultural evolution literature referring to Cavalli-Sforza and Boyd-Richerson
studies, mainly focuses on what happens if time invariant cultural values are transmitted
from one generation to the other (as in the contributions of Bisin and Verdier) and studies
the evolution of population shares under this assumption. Only recently, some interest
has been devoted to the study of convergence of non-xed cultural values (Brueckner and
Smirnov (2007, 2008) and Pichler (2008)). The more recent contributions studied the con-
ditions under which a melting pot equilibrium happens in terms of long run equilibrium,
nding that it may happen if there is a general cross in
uence among cultural values.
They focus on a single cultural value and they study what happens in the long run
Here, starting from the initial intuition of Boyd and Richerson (1985) about the impor-
tance of cultural transmission structures, we study what happens if attention is given to
the dierent oblique socialization schemes. Using a framework in which there are ethnic
groups and parents trying to transmit their attitudes towards the dierent groups, we are
able to understand what happens if dierent interaction schemes among ethnicities are
considered. Using schemes as Reciprocity and Ethnocentrism we prove that, if all agents
use the same socialization scheme, then the society may converge both to integration both
to a social hierarchy based on ethnicity, thus deriving equilibria consistent with empirical
studies. We then analyse what happens if dierent ethnic groups use dierent socialization
schemes. Using a network-derived framework we underline the role that dierent groups
may have in the convergence process: a groups may play as cultural bridge, cultural hubs
and if all groups have equal role, cultural cycles may arise. In this case, we also prove when
it is possible to arrive at an integration equilibrum and when it is not possible. We then
use this framework in order to get some insights on what happened in US with european
and black minorities: why the rst ones integrated while the second one experience much
25more diculty? This framework thus gives an instrument in order to analyse why dierent
minorities may end up with dierent long run integration equilibria. We do not provide yet
an endogenous explanation of the dierent socialization schemes. Still we can understand
what happens under dierent intergroup relation structures. We then provide the rst
steps for the endogeneization of socialization structures with some sucient conditions a
weights dynamics may satisfy in order to reach integration or segregation equilibria.
This study opens new roads in which the reasearch may be run: there is space in order
to understand what happens if the structure of the interethnic relationships change with
time, so provding an endogeneization of socialization schemes. Similarly it would be in-
teresting to study what happens if forms of socialization schemes other than reciprocity
and ethnocentrism may be implemented. Again it could be interesting to analyse what
happens if horizontal socializiation is taken into account into these schemes. An empirical
analysis on some case studies may be important.
26Appendix A. An Extension: Endogenous Oblique Socializa-
tions
IN the previous sectins we have shown how, given dierent weights structures, the society
will end up with a particular type of steady state. However, if real societies are used, we
should provide a criterion in order to decide which weight structure is more suitable to
the analysis in order not to give it exogenously.
In equation (5) we provided a general dynamic for which any V
ij
t+1 could potentially depend
on any V kw
t . Here we consider simpler dynamics derived from the ones described by the
4 socialization rules previously dened. Dynamics in this context dier in relation to the
structure of Oblique Socialization. In particular, given ethnicity i, oblique socialization
crucially depends on what extent agents i trusts other ethnicities in making their judg-
ments or how much the degree of similarity among them in
uences the attitude formation
scheme. We thus consider the case in which the weights agents assign to other ethnicities'
judgments only depend on a measure of similarity of values.
In order to study this kind of endogeneity, we introduce the concept of Cultural Similarity,
sij, being a measure of how a given ethnicity i is close to another one j. This similarity
will thus have an impact on the weights accordingly to the following basic rules:
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These properties state that the weight is positive if and only if the similarity is positive
so that two dissimilar groups do not interact in the attitude formation scheme. Then the
weight is increasing in the similarity between the considered ethnicities. Note that w
kj
t;ij








t;ik so that ethnocentrism
does not thold in this specication.
How now to determine the similarity? The measure of the similarity can be done on proper
sociological studies given the particular environment we would like the model to be applied
to, but this is not the road we would take in this theoretical work. Thus, coherently with
the model in which agents only cares about ethnicity, similar type vectors means that they
show similar cultural values, thus we propose an endogenous similarity index.
Dene 
ij
t = f(V i
t ;V
j
t ) : [0;1]n2


























 9  :s(
ij
t ) > 0 8
ij
t   , and s(
ij
t ) = 0 8
ij
t >  , with   2 [0;1].
This element is a similarity function such that self-similarity is always positive, it is de-
creasing in the value distance. The third condition states that there could exist a threshold
under which the similarity is set as 0, and that if 
ij
t = 0, meaning that the two ethnici-
27ties have identical values, then their similarity has to be positive also in the case in which
  = 0. We call   Openness Propensity. In fact, for high levels of  , the agents con-
sider also far ethnicities in their socialization schemes, so that they are open towards big
changes in their values. The opposite happens for low levels of  .
For the time being we have that all groups use the same similarity function and the thresh-

















xk = 1 and 0  xk  1 8k, and where there is a group independent similarity
function s(
ij
t ), and a group independent parameter  .
This is the most simple cultural distance we can think about. In particular the distance
between i and j is dened as a weighted mean of the absolute value of the dierences of
all their entries. Moreover we assume that all agents use the same similarity function and
that they have the same openness propensity (we extend to heterogenous propesities later




t so that, taken two ethnic
groups, they agree on the degree of similarity between them.
We can now state the following propositions:
Proposition 7. If Basic Cultural Distance holds and reciprocity is not considered in
any oblique socialization scheme ) the generalized Cavalli-Sforza Socialization dynamics
converges.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Proposition 8. If   = 1 or   = 0, given Basic Cultural Distance ) any Generalized
Cavalli-Sforza Socialization Dynamics converges.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Proposition 9. If there are only two ethnic groups, then given Basic Cultural Distance
) convergence happens.
Proof. See Appendix C.
We cannot provide a mathematical proof for convergence with reciprocity in socialization
scheme, endogenous weights and also a generic number (n > 2) of ethnic groups. However
we have run a big number of simulations with dierent intial values of any parameters and
convergence always happened. Thus we have reasons to think that convergence happens
also in this case under basic similarity. In particular reciprocity is such that at the rst
stages two dissimilar ethnicities belonging to two dierent submatrices may become sim-
ilar, while, as before, a irreducible submatrix may be split in two. Consequently we had
not found yet a way to prove oblique socialization stability, even though from simulations
this happens after the rst stages. Thus, a deeper mathematical analysis on this aspect is
needed.
28Last propositions and simulations state that if every couple of groups share the judgment
over reciprocal similarity, so that they both feel dissimilar or similar each other, whatever
the degree of this similarity, then convergence happens. In particular, if   is low, a hierar-
chy equilibrium is likely to be observed. Take, in fact, matrix B: every block consists of all
values of all ethnic groups linked by a certain degree of similarity. In particular if sik = 0
but sij > 0 and sjk > 0 then the values of these three ethnic groups produce an irreducible
block thus being a diagonal block in the B matrix. Then, as in the other hierarchy equi-
libria, every block converge to a dierent value, so that ethnic groups inside each block
integrate among them. This means that, while in the previously studied case ethnic social
ranking and reciprocity could not be shown together, this may happen here. In fact if
w
ji
t;ij > 0 ) V ij and V ji belong to he same diagonal block, thus they may converge to the
same value. In the meanwhile dierent blocks converge to dierent long run values so that
a ranking may rise. Moreover last propositions also states that it is not given that, if two
groups are at time t on an integration pattern then they will integrate. Consider the case
in which an irreducible submatrix is composed by two clusters of elements. In each cluster
similarity among groups is high, but only few elements in each cluster are connected with
elements of the other cluster with very low similarity. Then it can be that at the rst
steps each cluster would temporarily moves towards its mean. In this way there is the
possiblity of breaking the links between the clusters so that two independent submatrices
may rise. In this way every cluster will then converge to a dierent level.
Last proposition thus makes us able to understand why minorities may follow derent
integration patterns. Empirical evidence shows that european immigrants in US got inte-
grated faster than other minorities. In this way we explain that this may had happened
since values of european minorities were much closer to US ones than other ethnic groups.
This had brought to higher similarity perception between european and US people, and
thus to narrower linkages towards integration.
These proposition also claries a new role for vertical socialization. Dierently from the
cases in which weights were exogenous, in this case there is no need of positive vertical
socialization in order to get convergence. Vertical socialization had the role to make vales
at t + 1 rooted at their counterpart at time t, so to avoid cyclic matrices. If, then, para-





happens. In fact, children may nd own parents' values during oblique socialization as
well, so that vertical socialization is not the only place in which this may happen. Thus,
even if parents decide to produce a suboptimal eort level, convergence happens as well.






t;ij is high, parents may decide to give up part of their eort since the same
values may be tken by the children from the other forms of socialization.
Let's now analyse the eect of the Openness Parameter  : if it is very low we are in front
of what we can identify as an exclusive similarity, meaning that agents are very demanding
in terms of value similarity in order to consider others in their attitude formation scheme.
An inclusive similarity, on the other hand, holds if the threshold is high so that agents are
not so demanding in terms of similarity in order to question their own values and consider
other's attitudes in their socialization process.
In order to better understand the role if this parameter consider the matrices below that
report an example. The rst one represents the starting values, while the other three
29represent the equilibrium values for dierent levels of  s = 1    .
t = 0 i j k
i 1 0:6 0:2
j 0:8 1 0:2
k 0:8 0:4 1
 s = 0:9 i j k
i 1 0:6 0:2
j 0:8 1 0:2
k 0:8 0:4 1
 s = 0:8 i j k
i 0:63 0:63 0:2
j 0:63 0:63 0:2
k 0:8 0:4 1
 s = 0:4 i j k
i 0:43 0:43 0:43
j 0:43 0:43 0:43
k 0:43 0:43 0:43
The simulations had been run for pi = 0:7 and pj = pk = 0:15 so that the dierence in
the evolution of same size minorities become clearer. As in the previous cases, fertility
rates and transition probabilities are such that population vector is stable along time while
s
ij




















original situation is such that there is a bad attitude of i and j agents towards k and
s
ij
0 = 0:8, sik
0 = 0:6 and s
kj
0 = 0:53. In particular, there are two minorities, one of which
(k) is considered bad by te other two groups, while both minorities have a good attitude
towards the majority. Now, if  s is high, agents are very conservatives meaning that they
need a high degree of similarity in order to be in
uenced by others in their attitudes: this
is what we call exclusive similarity. As a result no change is shown in the long run. This
outcome can be considered similar to what it is usually called `closed society'. In particular
we observe that in this case contacts among agents of dierent groups are not useful in
order to get a higher degree of integration. Thus, it is not enough to make two groups in
touch in order to achieve at least a higher integration, if they cannot consider the other
group's values in their own values formation process. If  s is higher then groups begin to
be in
uenced, and, as a result, some groups will share the same attitudes set (i and j in
this case), while others (as k) do not change their attitudes. Only for low levels of  s we
have generalized cross in
uence: this is what we call inclusive similarity. In particular an
open society can be considered a one in which agents are prone towards diversity such that
they consider even distant groups in their attitude formation scheme. This open society
is the most likely to converge to integration outcomes. Thus interesting links between
these similarity thresholds eects and the `open society' of Popper can be analysed since,
if thresholds are low, then the intergroup contamination and the questioning of parents'
values is very likely to be similar to the critical thinking and tradition challenges Popper
talked about.
The case shown above also helps in the understanding of why even same size minorities
may have very dierent integration patterns. In this case, both minorities have good at-
titude towards majority, but one of them (i) share with the majority the bad attitude
towards the other. Then, if the society is not suciently opened, we observe the rst two
3In these simulations we weighted also for the population size. However, since we have set up the
vectors  n and   in order to have xed population shares, then they work only as scalars.
30integrating and the misconsidered minority being out of any integration pattern. This
numerical example makes us clear why cultural similar groups (i and j) may converge,
thus having some insights on the fact that european minorities in the US integrate faster
that other non-european groups. In fact if we suppose that European immigrant groups
were much more similar to Wasp majority than Black, Asians or Hispanics (and this is
reasonable since Wasp are derived from part of the european culture), we can reasonably
understand this phenomenon. We should also add that this similarity measure is not en-
tirely endogenous, so that it may take into account some other similarity measures. We
can think that some aspect of culture, as religious beliefs, may play a role. Moreover, if
we think at some peculiar historical aspects, as black slavery, this will play for sure a role
in the patterns of dierent ethnic groups. We can thus think that black slavery had an
impact on the initial values of the V . Thus, noting that this parameter is such a sensible
element in the model, some extensions on how this may change, how it is in
uenced by
institutions and how it can be part of a policy for integration becomes crucially important.
In this framework another interesting insight is the possibility that the openness parameter
is group dependent so taking values  i. This means that two ethnic groups may dier in
their openess degree. Even though this threshold is considered here as exogenous, it can
be a function of the socio-economic role of the group in the society. If the group is loosing
position in the economic position scale, for example, it could be reasonable to observe
lower levels of openess since a fear of loosing values may arise. On the other hand, if a
group is experiencing a gain in socio-economic positions then agents may become more
open for the opposite reason. Thus, depending on the thresholds levels and the initial
similarity values, it could happen that sij 6= sji so that non symmetric socialization rules
holds: this happens if the similarity is above the threshold for one group and below for
the other4. In this way, depending on how the dynamics proceedes, some agent that do
not consider others attitude at the beginnnig, if they become closer, may consider them,
or the opposite may happen. Consider again the previous initial situation in which there
is a majority i, and two minorities such that one of them, j, is similar to the majority, and
the other one, k, that is less similar, while the degree of similarity between the minorities
is very low. We analyse now the cases in which one of these groups, in turn, shows a high
level of openess ( s = 0:4), while the other two shows a high level of closeness ( s = 0:8).
The graphs below show the cases in which in turns, i, j, and k respectively have a low
opennes parameter level, while the tables below show the equilibrium values.
The rst case represents the one in which the majority is open: we can identify two pe-
riods in the convergence. In the rst one we have that one ethnic group does not feel
similar to anyother and thus it has no contamination nor dynamics: this is the k group
for the rst 20 generations. After this period of time i agents (and j agents through i's
in
uence) became closer such that now both j and k begin to include the others in the
socialization scheme experiencing the convergence of the second period. This irregularity
in convergence makes again clearer the role of this parameter in the understanding of
short run cross-in
uences: having in fact a short run view over the dynamics it could be
thought that k agents would never wanted to integrate in the society. It was then enough,
in this case, to have one group (i) that uses inclusive similarity and is felt similar to a
4This same fact may happen if similarity function is group specic, but we do not consider this case
here.
31group using exclusive similarity (j) in order to create a bridge for long run integration.
In this case, i agents have to be patient and waint for almost 20 generations before hving
the rst results of their openness: this gives the idea that integration processes may not
be a matter of yearsbut o decades or more.


























































































Figure 6: Simulations with endogenous weights
t = 0 i j k
i 1 0:6 0:2
j 0:8 1 0:2
k 0:8 0:4 1
 si = 0:4 i j k
i 0:55 0:55 0:55
j 0:55 0:55 0:55
k 0:55 0:55 0:55
 sj = 0:4 i j k
i 0:8 0:8 0:4
j 0:8 0:748 0:4
k 0:8 0:4 1
 sk = 0:4 i j k
i 0:42 0:42 0:42
j 0:42 0:42 0:42
k 0:42 0:42 0:42
The second case represents the situation in which the minority closer to the majority is
open: then even though some in
uences from the k groups happen to be observed, in
the long run i and j integrate almost perfectly, while the other minority group remains
segregated. This also happens for a total open minority: in fact, since j agents are more
similar to i than to k, then they will always take more care of i values that of k values, so
that their mean will always be biased in favour of the rsts. Consequently it never happens
that i and k become suciently close to be in
uenced each other. If, on the other hand,
the most dissimilar minority is opened (as in the third case), then integration happens
32since the ethnicity that was an obstacle for integration removes the closeness prejudice.
These three simple numerical examples are just indicative of three phenomena that can
happen during the integration process. We can thus capture the fact that we can observe
strong changes in the integration process with groups that do not integrate until a given
similarity level is reached, and other groups working as bridge-builders across ethncities.
We can give reason of the fact that the most dissimilar group remains segregated even in
the case in which other groups are opened towards it, since tighter links hold among most
similar groups.
As in the previous case, we run a great number of simulation with dierent values for the all
the parameters involved in the dynamics and we have always observed convergence. Even
though we are not able to provide a mathematical proof for this convergence, looking at
the simulation that cover a wide range of possibilities, we are condent that convergence
happens also for group specic openness levels. With this last part we make clear the
eect that heteroegenous propensities towards openness may have on the nal outcome.
We are consciuos that these measures may be endogenous, but for the time being we
consider them as dependent on something out of the model, and dependent on some socio-
economic position of the group, as previously argued. However these last results make
clear the role that a policy focused on making people more open and tolerant may have
on integration policies, since it comes clear that, besides material factors, these are crucial
elements of the problem. Moreover, the endogenization of the socialization rule does not
help in explaining why cycles may be observed, but drives us towards the direction of
nding them into the changes of the socio-economic position of the groups, thus providing
an exogenous explanation for these phenomena. On the other side, racism per se may
be a results of the endogenous dynamics, if agents do no show a suciently high level of
tolerance and openness. If weights are endogenized in order to depend both on similarity
and population shares, and population dynamics shows cycles, then it can be that cycles
in racism may be consequently observed.
33Appendix B: Weights Matrices for Simulations
We report below the weight matrices we used in the simulations for gure 1. With respect
to the cases reported in the denition of socialization rules we impose that w
jj
t;ij = 0;8i;j
meaning that in forming ij attitude, i agents do not consider the re
exive attitude of j.
This does not change the way in which dynamics happens, but just levels. In particular
it avoids that in HEE and IEE everything converges to V = E = 1, as it is clear from
proposition 4-5. Moreover we just write X where there is a positive weight. The weights
are represented by the population shares so that, for example, w
kj
ij = pk. Since here pop-
ulation shares are constant, then the weight matrix is xed.
HE ii ij ik ji jj jk ki kj kk
ii X 0 0 X 0 0 X 0 0
ij 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 X 0
ik 0 0 X 0 0 X 0 0 0
ji 0 0 0 X 0 0 X 0 0
jj 0 X 0 0 X 0 0 X 0
jk 0 0 X 0 0 X 0 0 0
ki 0 0 0 X 0 0 X 0 0
kj 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 X 0
kk 0 0 X 0 0 X 0 0 X
IE ii ij ik ji jj jk ki kj kk
ii X 0 0 X 0 0 X 0 0
ij 0 X 0 X 0 0 0 X 0
ik 0 0 X 0 0 X X 0 0
ji 0 X 0 X 0 0 X 0 0
jj 0 X 0 0 X 0 0 X 0
jk 0 0 X 0 0 X 0 X 0
ki 0 0 X X 0 0 X 0 0
kj 0 X 0 0 0 X 0 X 0
kk 0 0 X 0 0 X 0 0 X
HEE ii ij ik ji jj jk ki kj kk
ii X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ij 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 X 0
ik 0 0 X 0 0 X 0 0 0
ji 0 0 0 X 0 0 X 0 0
jj 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0
jk 0 0 X 0 0 X 0 0 0
ki 0 0 0 X 0 0 X 0 0
kj 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 X 0
kk 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X
IEE ii ij ik ji jj jk ki kj kk
ii X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ij 0 X 0 X 0 0 0 X 0
ik 0 0 X 0 0 X X 0 0
ji 0 X 0 X 0 0 X 0 0
jj 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0
jk 0 0 X 0 0 X 0 X 0
ki 0 0 X X 0 0 X 0 0
kj 0 X 0 0 0 X 0 X 0
kk 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X
Appendix C: Proofs of the Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Since i
t 2 [0;1] ) V
ij
t+1(i;  pt;  Vt) is bounded and continous in  ) Wii
t is (bounded and)
continous in i
t. Since c(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34Moreover it cannot be 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Proof of Proposition 2



















. Since, by porposition 1, i

t ( pt;  Vt) 2 (0;1)
is endogenous, then the dynamics is not linear in  Vt. Consider now any i
t 2 (0;1) exogenously
given at any time and for each group such that i

t ( pt;  Vt) 2 (0;1) is only one possible value for i
t.
We will prove convergence for any i
t such that convergence for i

t ( pt;  Vt) is only a specic case.
Thus convergence will also happen for every suboptimal i
t 2 (0;1).
Let's now order the type entries in order to get a (n2X1) vector such that we have

























t;ij = (1   i
t)wkw













t , in which At is the (n2Xn2) matrix in
which the entries are the akw
t;ij, 8i;j;k;w, so that A is row-normalized.
Consider now the A matrix. Since i
t > 0 ) aii
t > 0 8i ().
Brueckner and Smirnov (2007, 2008) proved that given a linear system V 0
t+1 = AV 0
t , then if A is
irreducible5 for all t, if at least one diagonal element is positive (thus, since () holds, then this
condition is satised), then it is also acyclic6, and thus the dynamics converges to a steady state.
Since weights wkw
ij are time independent, and i
t 2 (0;1), the matrix A is always irreducible or al-
ways not reducible. Consequently Brueckner and Smirnov (2007, 2008) immediately applies when
the matrix A is irreducible. Moreoever, in this case, they prove that all elements converge to the
same value. Now, if A is not irreducible, it can always be rewritten as an upper-triangular-block
matrix as B:
5A square matrix A is irreducible if and only if for each i and j there exists some k such that (aij)
k > 0,
with (aij)
k being the ij entry of the k
th power matrix of A. Moreover a matrix is irreducible if and only
if the digraph associated to A is strongly connected.
6Call dii the period of the aii element of the A square matrix. dii is the greatest common divisors
among all k such that (aij)
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in which every bii is a square block, while some non-diagonal blocks may have all zero entries.
Given time independent weights and i
t 2 (0;1), the strucure of the B matrix is time invariant
8t  T. If B is a block-diagonal matrix then, since every diagonal block is irreducible and, by (*),
acyclic, thenevery block convergs and thus overall convergence happens.
If B is not a block diagonal matrix, take the bnn block. Again the structure of the matrix is time
invariant. bnn converges since it is irreducible and acyclic.Take any V ij belonging to the bn 1;n 1
process. Then, we can always nd weights t, t and 
t such that any element V
ij
t of this process





t 1 + t bn 1;n 1 + 
t bnn (7)
with t 2 (0;1] (since i
t > 0), t 2 <+ and 
t 2 <+ in which  bn 1;n 1 is the value at which the
elements of the bn 1;n 1 diagonal block had converged if the dynamics would have been given only
by this diagonal block;  bnn is the convergence points of the block bnn.
Now, for cases for which w
ij
t;ij = 1 then t = 1;t = 
t = 0. Since weights are xed, then this
holds for all periods, so that these entries do not show any dynamics.
Consider now entries with w
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j!.
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t 2:::t t+2



































is an increasing sequence bounded above by a converging sequence, so
that it converges.












t is a nite sum of converging series so that it converges too. Thus the elements of the
(n   1;n   1) block converge. If we recursively apply this reasoning to all the other blocks until
we reach the (b11) block, then convergence is proved.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. A system like V 0
t+1 = AV 0
t converges if each diagonal block of the transmission matrix
is acyclic and the derived digraph is strongly connected. In all cases, socialization rules imply
w
ij
ij > 0;8i;j, such that all the diagonal blocks of the transmission matrix are acyclic. If Emulation
Rule holds, we have that all the elements V ij 8i form a single fully connected component, so that
it is also strongly connected, thus the matrix associated with the digraph is irreducible. Thus, by
Brueckner and Smirnov (2007, 2008), convergence to a common value for each component, and thus
to a HE, happens. This can also be seen by the fact that the mastrix is diagonal and symmetric
and thus can be transformed into a block diagonal matrix in which every block is irreducible
and thus converges. The Reciprocity rule diers from the previous one since each component is
connected to the other ones since there are the double links between V ij and V ji 8i;j, so that all
V ij 8i;j forms a single strongly connected digraph and, for the same reason as before, convergence
to a IE happens. The Ethnocentrism Rule and Reciprocity and Ethnocentrism rule dier from
the previous ones in the sense that V ii = E 8i such that each of these re
exive elements forms a
component per se and do not show any dynamics. The remaining elements have a structure as in
the previous two cases thus convergence respectlivey to HEE and IEE happens.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Each component forms a dynamics system per se and thus may be considered separately
from the others. Consider rst the case in which the elements of a group are strongly connected.
Then the transmission matrix may be represented as a block diagonal matrix in which each block
is irreducible and thus convergence happens. If there is one sink then it can be represented as a
upper triangular block matrix in which the sink is the right-bottom block. From proposition 2 in
this case convergence holds too. In order to prove that all th elements of the same component
converge to the same value, consider rst the case in which the sink is only one node. Then the




























::: ::: ::: ::: :::











so that Xt+1 = BtXt = BtX0. In terms of Markov processes, this can be identied as a Non-
Homogenous single-unireducible Markov Process. Given the structure of our process, the limit
probability of the markov process represented by the transmission matrix represents the limit of
matrix of weights. Consequently if the limit probability of the markiv process exist, then the pro-
cess converges, and if the limit probaility can be identied, then the limit of the matrix of weights
can be identied.











0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1
::: ::: ::: ::: :::







so that convergence to the sink level happens.
Consider now the case that the sink is composed of more that one element. Since all the nodes of
the sink are strongly connected, then they converge to the same value I. Consequently we have










1t 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0 0 0 0 i 1t it





































1t 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i 1t + 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3t ::: 0 
i 1t + 
it
::: ::: ::: ::: 0 :::
0 0 0 0 1 0




























Since the last two elements do not show any dynamics and they are xed on the same values, we
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Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Since all elements forms a single component the proof for convergence is the same as the
one for convergence of each component in proposition 4
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Suppose that ethnocentrism does not hold. If assumptions 3 and 4 hold then the matrix is
always compoes of only one irreducible component. By assumption 1 this is also acyclic, so that,
by Brueckner and Smirnov (2007, 2008) convergence happens. If ethnocentrism hold, then the
symmetric traits V ii;8i are xed, while all the weights for the other traits form a single irreducible
component and thus convergence happens.
We prove now the second part of the proposition. If assumption 4 holds, then the matrix structure
is stable. Each component forms a dynamics system per se and thus may be considered separately
from the others. Consider rst the case in which the elements of a group are strongly connected
at time T, so that they will always be strongly connected. Then the transmission matrix may be
represented as a block diagonal matrix in which each block is irreducible and thus, by Brueckner and
Smirnov (2007, 2008) convergence happens. If there is one sink then the matrix can be represented
as a upper triangular block matrix in which the sink is the right-bottom block. Consequently the
proof follows as the one for proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 7




t . Consequently, since if w
ji
t;ij > 0 )
w
ij
t;ji > 0 and, from the Basic Cultural Distance denition it derives that ii
t = 0 <   )
w
ij
t;ij > 0;8i;j;t, so that ) A matrix is irreducible or it can be written as a block-diagonal ma-
trix B in which every diagonal block is irreducible. The positive entries are in fact positive since
w
kj









b11 0 0 0 0
0 b22 0 0 0
0 0 ::: ::: :::
0 0 0 bn 1;n 1 0







t > 0 ) w
ij
t;ij > 0 8i;j;t, so that all diagonal elements are positive, so that any
diagonal block is acyclic.
In order to prove convergence we should prove that 9T such that the matrix structure is xed
8t  T. Consider time t + 1. Two diagonal independent blocks at time t cannot form a unique
irreducible diagonal block at t+1. In order to prove this, call ni a generic element of block N and
39mj a generic element of block M such that 
nimi
t >   8i;j, 
ninj
t <  , and 
mimj
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t ) >   + 1


























t ) >   + 1
Multiply both side of every element of the rst column by at;nini (the correspondent element of the
A matrix), both side of every element of the second colum by at;ninj and so on, and take the sum of
the elements of each row, remembering that
X
j



































t ) >   + 1
If we multiply both side of every element of the rst row by at;mimi, both side of every element of















































t+1 j >  .





t+1 = 0 so that two diagonal blocks can never merge in one unique irreducibe block. Thus
at t + 1 we have that either each block remains irreducible or it splits in two or more irreducibe
blocks. Since the number of ethnicities in each block is nite we end up either with all singletons
or with distinct blocks. Thus convergence happens.
Proof of Proposition 8
40Proof. If   = 1, then s
ij
t > 0;8i;j;t so that all ethnicities form one single component, the matrix
A is thus irreducible and convergence happens.
If   = 0, then each group forms a component by its own, apart for the case in which two ethnic




t the two groups show no dynamics




t then from t+ 1 they become dierent in entries so that each of them
form a separate component. Thus convergence happens.
Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. If 
ij
t >   then they do not in
uence each others and thus they stay xed. If 
ij
t <  
they form an irreducible block and they move towards the SS. If they always remain linked, they
converge, if they become dissimilar at some point in time the stay xed for all the rest of the time.
Thus convergence happens.
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